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An increase in real interest rates, which is a typical element of
financial reforms, does not necessarily involve a positive effect
on private investment unless the authorities are careful to ensure
that  (1) bank deposits are closer substitutes to unproductive
assets (cash, gold) and foreign assets than to capital goods, (2)
the financial sector assures an efficienlt  allocation of domestic
credit, and (3) the flow of domestic credit to.the private sector is
not absorbed by the needs of the public sector.
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Assuming that li4uidity constraints exist in most  bank deposits reduces the private sector's
developing countries, the majority of analysts  willingness to hold government bonds, so the
believe that increasing real interest rates will  public sector must finance a given budget deficit
raise the volume of lending and hence private  with more domestic credit.
investment.
His simulations for Argentina for 1961-82
Morisset, focusing on the demand for capital  suggest that the low response of private investors
goods, argues that the positive effect on the  to changes in interest rate policy in those 20
domestic credit*  market may be offset by the  years was attributable not to the low values of
negative effect of a portfolio shift from capital  interest elasticities but to the interaction of the
goods and public bonds into monetary assets.  mechanisms allowed for in the model, which
He also demonstrates that a policy of financial  tends to neutralize the impact of such policies.
liberalization could increase the public sector's
demand for domestic credit, thus limiting the  Morisset concludes that the effect of changes
funds available to the private sector.  This  in interest rate policy on the demand for capital
crowding out does not result from a change in  goods is weak in Argentina - and might affect
the government's  behavior but from a shift in the  the quality of private investment more than its
portfolio of private agents.  Higher demand for  quantity.
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Inteoduction
In  the  economlc  literature,  the  relationship  between  real  intereat
and  private  investment  in  LDCs has  received  considerable  attention.
Until  the  early  1970s,  the  economists  assumed  that  low  interest  rates
would  promote  investment  spending  and  economic  growth  in  accordance  with
Keynesi&n  and  neoclassical  theories.  McKinnon (1973)  and  Shaw (1973)
were  the  first  to  challenge  seriously  this  conventional  wisdom.  These
two  authors  suggested  that  higher  real  interest  rates  would  raise
savings,  increase  the  volume  of  domestic  credits  extended  by  the
financial  system  and  hence  the  equilibrium  rate  of  investment.  In  order
to  assess  tho  McKinnon-Shaw  hypothesis,  an  impressive  number  of
empirical  studies  have  been  carried  out  during  recent  year2/.  In  the
present  state  of  research,  the  tendency  is  to  admit  the  validity  of  this
hypothesis.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  establishing  high  real  interest  rates
has  become  a  standard  part  of  the  policy  advice  given  to  LDC's by
external  experts,  ranging  from  the  visiting  academic  economist  via  the
World  Bank to  emissaries  of  the  IH(see  Van  Wijnbergen  (1983)  or  Polak
(1989)).
The  most  favored  justification  for  a  high  interest  rates  policy  in
LDCs is  derived  from  the  presence  of  liquidity  constraints  on  private
investment  decisions.  Policies  that  impose  artificially  low  interest
rate  ceilings  tend  to  constrain  the  supply  of  capital  and  lead  to  an
excess  demand for  capital  relative  to  what  would  happen  if  the  deposit
interest  rate  were  allowed  to  find  its  market-clearing  level.  Because
the  principal  constraint  on  investment  is  the  quantity,  rather  than  the
cost,  of  financial  resources,  a  rise  in  interest  rates  will  increase  the
supply  of  credit  to  finance  private  investment.  "Any effect  exerted  by
the  rate  of  interest  on  private  investment  is  not  direct  within  thls
rationing  framework  but,  rather,  occurs  via  the  channel  of  financial
savinsl (Blejer  an  Khan  (1984),  p.386).  Even  if  a  clear  consensus  has
emerged  in  recent  years  that  a  significant  fraction  of  the  population  in
developing  countries  is affected  by  liquidity constraints3/,  the
problematic  issue  is  how  far  to  go.  We argue,  by  focusing  on  the  demand
for  capital  goods,  that  a  number  of  factors  might  influence  the
relationship  between  real  interest  rates,  the  supply  of  domestic  credits
and  private  investment.
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  confront  the  HcKinnon-Shaw
hypothesis  with  a simple  model  of  investment  behavior.  The resulting
model  is  esetimted  and  simulated  for  Argentina  over  the  1°  .- 82  period,
giventhat  this  country  has  been  affected  by  various  inte.est  rates
2/For  a  review  of  this  literature,  see  Fry  (1988).
3/Note  that  the  rationing  in  LDCs  is  justified  as  a  disequilibrium
phenomenon caused  by  legal  ceilings  on  interest  rates.  By contrast,  for
developed  countries,  the  argument  is  based  on  modern  theories  of
imperfect  information.4
policies  during  the  last  twenty  years4/.  Simulation  results  indicate
that,  in  the  case  of  Argentina,  the  quantity  of  private  investment  is
little  responsive  to  movements  in  interest  rates.  While  this  finding  may
not  be  entirely  unexpected  (e.g.  Khatkhate  (1988)),  it  appears  that  this
insensitivity  is'not  due  to the  low  values  of some  important  parameters,
but  rather  to  the  interactions  of  many  opposing  forces  allowed  by  the
model.  In  particular,  we will  demonstrate  that  the  positive  effect
suggested  by  McKinnon and  Shaw may be  offset  sLultanseously  by  a
crowding  out  effect  and  a  shift  that  could  occur  iu  the  portfolio  of  the
private  sector.
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  In  section  1  we  present  a
simplified  portfolio  model.  Although  this  approach  is  derived  from  a
Tobin-Sidrauski  framework,  a liquidity  constraint  is Introduced  into  the
model  in  accordance  with  the  McKinnon-Shaw  hypothesis.  The  demand  for
capital  accumulation  by  the  users  of  capital  goods  is  specified  in
section  2  using  a  modified  version  of  the  flexible  accelerator  theory  of
investment.  Section  3  is  devoted  to  the  demonstration  that  the  positive
Impact  of a rise  in interest  rates  on the  supply  of  domestic  credlts  to
finance  private  investment  might  be  reduced  or  even  reversed  when  the
public  sector  is  introduced  Into  the  analysis.  The  equations
constituting  the  complete  model  are  presented  in  Table  2.  The  empirical
results  for  Argentina  are  presented  and  discussed  in  section  4.  Finally,
section  5 contains  our  conclusion.
1.  A  Siple Portfolio  Model
An increase  in  real  interest  rates  following  a financial
liberalization  generates,  in  general,  a  portfolio  shift  in  favor  of  bank
deposits.  The  authors  in  favor  of  the  HcKinnon-Shaw  hypothesis  assume
that  this  portfolio  shift  is  coming  out  from  unproductive  assets  such  as
cash  and  gold.  This  seems,  however,  a  drastic  simplification  of  the
reality  because  it is not  at all  obvious  that  deposits  are closer
substitutes  to  these  unproductive  assets  than  to  capital  goods  in  LDCs.
To illustrate  this  point,  private  Investment  in  LDCs is  mostly  the
demand  for  capital  accumulation  by the  owner  of capital  (see  Khatkhate
(1988,  p.580)).  This  form  of  savings  tends  to  decline  when  real  interest
rates  rise  and  correspondingly  saving  in  financial  assets  goes  up.
Unless  the  latter  effect  dominates  significantly  the  former  effect,
private  real  investment  may  not  register  an  upwards  change  with  the  rise
in the  real interest  rate.  In this  section,  we  address  the  critical
issue  of  whether  the  positive  effect  suggested  by  HcKinnon  and  Shaw  is
strong  enough  to  offset  the  shift  from  capital  goods  into  mon.tary
assets  that  could  occur  in the  portfolio  of private  agents.
A/Specification  using  cross-section  data  from  LDCs, while  providing  many
more  observations,  assumes  aa  similarity  of  behaviors  which  is
questionable.As a  starting  point,  we  consider  the  following  real  budget
conseraint  for the  private  sector5/  S
(1)  apt  4' OLptJP +  OcD1P  - +  Oht  4+ Mo
The private  sector  can  accumulate  assets  into  three  components  s
real  domestic  money  (  m),  real  domestic  assets  (Oh)  and  real  foreign
assets  (  J).  Eqution (1)  states  that  prlvate  expenditure  for  net
accumulatLion  of  assets  is  constrained  by  the  amount  of  real  private
savings  (se),  the  changes  in  net  real  domestlc  credits  to  the  prlvate
sector  extended  by  the  banking  system  (  L 0/P)  and  the  changes  in  gross
real  prlvate  external  debt  (  Dp/P).
The  demand for  real  monetary  assets  is  defined  as  the  changes  in
the  stock  of  money H3.  Although  forelga  assets  purchasing  by  residents
are  not  recent,  no  such  dlrect  measures  are  avallable  for  developing
countries.  Therefore  capital  flight  is  used  as  representative  of  thLs
form  of  savings.  The  definltion  proposed  by  the  World Bank  (1985)
appears  to  be  the  most  approprlate  to  measure  foreign  assets  holdligs  by
the  private  sector  slnce  lt does  not  dlstingulsh  between  normal'
capital  flows  and  capital  flights
(2) jt,,  - (ODt +  I*t  - R,)/P - ft
Thls  deflnltion  of  capltal  flight  takes  inflows  of  capltal  In  the
form  of  increases  in  gross  external  debt  (  D)  and  net  forelgn  direct
investment  (1*)  and  subtracts  from  these  inflows  the  current  account
deficit  (f)  and  the  increase  in  official  reserves  (  R).  The dlfference
between  these  lnflows  and  the  extent  to  whlch  they  are  used  to  finance
the  current  account  deflclt  and  an  increase  in  reserves  is  taken  to
reflect  an  increase  in  net  forelgn  claims  by  the  private  sector  (  j).
Flnally,  real  domestic  assets  (Oh)  are  nothing  but  the  difference
between  the  financlng  avallable  to  the  private  sector  and  the  two
components  defined  above.  Thuss
(3)  Qht  - Spt  +  QDpt/P *s-  OLp /P  - 64  - iet  +  bbt
Real  domestic  assets  include  the  amounts  of  physical  capital  (lp)
and  public  bonds  (  b)  that  the  private  sector  can  accumulate.  Goverrment
bonds  are  assumed  to  be  net  wealth  to  the  private  sector  because
liquldlty  constralnts,  by  preventing  the  optimal  consumption-savings
declslons  from  being  realized,  can  make present  taxatlon  less  desirable
to  households  than  future  taxatlon  (e.g.  Haque  (1988)).
5/SLnce  the  model  is  designed  explicltly  for  empirical  testing,  we do
not  distingulsh  firms  and  households  ln  (1).  Indeed,  lf  we  assume  that
all  firms  equlties  are  held  by  households,  this  asset  can  be  eliuinated
from  (1).  Furthermore,  Tybout  (1986)  suggested  that  both  behaviors  can
be  speclfied  by  a  portfolio  model.The  demand  for  Om,  Oh, and  Oj can  be  specified  by  a standard
portfolio  model6/.  For  simplicity,  we assume  that  the  amount  of
private  savings  is  predetermined  so  that  we can  write7/s
(4a)  &a  c  +  is  11y  +  4s  '  +  ss  +  + 4 )  Ra(w/P)  /
(Cb)  Oh - 420  +  colY +  got  +  £14(r*+x)  +  R,Q(ODO/P) +  ffWWL,IP)  +
cnu7p-l
(4c)  Oj-  a  +  isly +  4  4  +  r  4'+  £&.(*+x)  +  9N(W/P)  +  dcA,(P/)  +
where  r  is  defined  as  the  ex  ante  domestic  real  interest  rate  on
deposits,  r*  as  the  foreign  real  interest  rate,  x  as  the  expected  rate
of  depreciation  of  the  local  currency,  y  as  real  income,  wo as  the
expected  rate  of  inflation  and  wp  as  net  real  wealth  accumulated  by  the
private  sector.
The  demand  functions  (4)  are  based  on  the  theoretical  arguments
proposed  by  Brainard-Tobin  (1968)  and  Purvis  (1976).  These  authors
suggested  that  assets  demands  depend  essentially  of  the  disposable
income,  the  level  of  private  wealth  held  in  beginning  of  period  and  the
rates  of  return  on  alternative  assets.  We  defined  the  return  on  money  as
the  ex  ante  real  interest  rate  on  deposits  and  admitted  that  the  demand
for  domestic  assets  is  positively  correlated  with  the  expected  rate  of
inflation.  The expected  rate  of  inflation  enters  to  represent  portfolio
shifts  towards  capital  goods  and  government  bonds  (indexed  assets)  as
the  expected  real  rate  of  return  on  money  falls  (see  Tobin  (1965),
Sidrauski  (1967)  and  Fisher  (1979)).  Note  that  we  do  not  distinguish  the
demand  for  capital  goods  and  government  bonds  because  the  rates  of
return  on  both  assets  are  generally  indexed  in  developing  countries  with
high and  variable  inflation.  Further  desegregation  of domestic  assets
will  take  place  in  section  2.  We  defined  the  expected  Late  of  return  on
foreign  assets  as  the  foreign  real  interest  rate  and  the  expected  rate
of  depreciation  of  the  local  currency.  In  order  to  take  into  account  the
existence  of  liquidity  constraints  on  portfolio's  decisions,  the
variations  in  bank  credits  to  the  private  sector  (  Lp) and  in  foreign
capital  iflows (  Dp) have  been  introduced  into  the  model.  An increase
in  real  credit  or  in  foreign  financing  will  in  general  encourage  the
acquisition  of  assets  since  the  economic  agents  are  limited  by  the
availability  of  their  current  resources.
The  expected  signs  for  the  parameters  of  equation  (4)  are
sumrized  in  table  1.  Each  rate  of  return  influences  positively  the
6/A  similar  model  has  been  presented  in  more  details  in  Morisset  (1989).
7/The  decision  between  present  consumption  and  future  consumption  does
not  seem to  be  significantly  influenced  by  the  real  rate  of  interest  in
most  developing  countries  (e.g.  Giovannini  (1983)  or  Khatkhate  (1988)).S - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7
asaet  to  which  it  is  associated  and  negatively  others  assets8/.  We
also  assume  that  an  increase  in  GDP  level  raises  the  demand  for  money
(transaction  motive)  and  decreases  the  demand for  foreign  assets  (see
Conesa  (1986)).  In  the  presence  of  borrowing  constraints,  one  increase
in L. or  In  OD. is  expccted  to  be  positive  on  the  three  assets  demands.
Recently.  va.ious  authrs argued  In favor  of a  positive  relationship
between  the  variation  In  gross  extemal  debt  and  capital  flight  (e.g.
Cuddington  ^0987))  and  Lessard  and  Williamson  (1987)).
In  view  of  the  budget  constraint  (1)  it  Is  clear  that  the  three
asset  demand functions  are  linearly  dependant.  Once  an  agent  has
determined  his  holdings  of  any  two  assets  given  the  level  of  the
rescaurces  available  to  him,  his  demand for  the  third  asset  has
implicitly  been  determined  as  well.  Thus  the  following  restrictions  must
holds
(5S-) (Il  +  E8J+  4S  - 0  with  j  - 1,2,3,4  and  7
ON (  tJ + aj  4+  gJ  a  I  vwith  j  - 5 and  6
Hence equations  (4)  are  linearly  dependant  and  one  equation  must
be  omitted  for  the  estimation  of  the  model.
The  model  (1)-(4)  is  similar  to  the  one  presented  by  Tobin  (1965)
in  the  sense  that  an  increase  in  the  demand for  financial  savings
following  high  real  interest  rates  on  deposits  will  generally  lead  to  a
reduction  in  domestic  assets  demands.  ThLe portfolio  shift  represents
the larger  attractiveness  of  holding  money  than  productive  capital  and
public  bonds.  However,  this  approach  fails  to  take  into  account  the
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis  which  assumes  a  positive  relationship  between
the  demand for  money and  the  demand  for  capital  accumulation  via  the
domestic  credits  to  the  private  sector  extended  by  the  banking  system.
This  positive  link  between  money  demand  and  real  investment  may  be
easily  introduced  into  the  model  through  the  real  budget  constraint  of
the  financial  sector.  The  banking  system,  which  is  assumed  to  integrate.
the  central  bank  and  cow-arcial  banks,  accumulates  reserves,  extends
credit  to  the  government  and  the  private  sector,  and  issues  liabilities
in  the  form  of  money:
(6)  (6LP/P)  =  m - (6R/P)  (OL 6IP)  +  nw
where  the  real  banking  system  net  profit  (Onw)  Le defined  as  the
difference  between  receipts  and  outlays,  i.e.  Interest  received  minus
interest  paid  plus  other  net  non-interest  Income minus  operating
expenses,  corrected  by  the  changes  in  domestic  inflation  and  exchange
rates9/.
8/In  other  words  these  three  assees  are  gross  oubstitutes.
9/We can  express  the  banking  system  net  profit  as sEquation  (6)  indicates  that  a  rise  in  money demand must  cause,
ceteris  paribus,  an  Increase  in  the  supply  of  credit  to  the  private
sector  since  domestic  credit  is  the  primary  asset  backing  the  monetary
liabilities  of  the  banking  system.  Moreover,  this  presentation  also
emphasizes  that  the  amount  of  credit  to  the  private  sector  is  not
directly  controlled  by  the  financial  sector  In  most  developing
countries.  First,  controls  on  credit  to  the  private  sector  have  been  the
principal  lnstruments  of  the  monetary  policy  and,  second,  the  amount  of
credit  to  the  public  sector  has  been  usually  determined  by  the  demand of
the  government  rather  than  the  supply  of  the  financial  systemlO/.
Introducing  (6)  into  the  system  (l)-(4),  we  can  reconcile  the
Tobin's  arguments  and  the  HcKinnon-Shaw hypothesis.  In  a financial
liberalization  program,  the  real  rate  of  interest  on  deposits  and
lending  rates  are  In  general  both  decontrolled.  The variation  in  the
deposit  interest  rate  should  encourage  financial  savings  accumulation
while  the  variation  in  lending  rates  should  assure  positive  profits  by
the  banking  system.  Note,  however,  that  the  variation  in  lending  rates
does  not  affect  directly  assets  demands because,  under  rationing,  the
cost  of  credit  is  not  an  argument  of  the  private  sector's  portfolio
behavior.  The  total  impact  of  a  variation  in  real  interest  rates  on  the
demand for  domestic  assets  isll/  &
d(Ah)  ana
7)  - 3 +  or  < O
dr  (1  - ld
The  first  term  corresponds  to  the  substitution  effect  suggested  by
Tobin  and  the  second  term  to  the  positive  effect  postulated  by McKinnon
and  Shaw.  A variation  (say  an  increase)  in  the  real  interest  rate
changes  the  asset  portfolio  as  assetholders  move out  of  real  savings  and
foreign  assets  into  domestic  money.  On the  other  hand,  the  rise  In  money
demand increases  the  supply  of  domestic  credits  to  the  private  sector
and  private  investment  since  the  private  sector  is  assumed  to  be
liquidity  constrained.  The total  impact  of  a  change  in  the  interest  rate
Om  - (i  Lp -)L  p-F  - (its  - +)  (i*  - - z)R_. 1 P - (i0  -)  -t  +
ni
where  IL. is  defined  as  the  nominal  lending  interest  rate  to  the  private
sector,  iL. as  the  nominal  lending  interest  rate  to  the  public  sector,
1*  as  the  foreign  nominal  interest  rate,  L.  as  the  nominal  interest  rate
on  deposits,  ni  as  other  net  non-interest  income,  i'  as  the  inflation
rate,  P as  price  level  and  z  as  the  rate  of  depreciation  of  the  local
currency.
10/see  section  4  for  a  more precise  discussion  on  this  remark.
lI/For  simplicity,  we assume  that  real  disposable  income  and  financial
sector9s  net  profits  are  not  influenced  by  changes  in  real  interest
rates  In  equation  (7).  Higher  borrowing  and  lending  rates  should  affect
these  two  variables  in  opposite  directions  so  that  the  total  effect
should  be  weak.9
depends  oan  whether  the  increase  in  domestic  credites  due  to  the  McEinnon-
Shaw  effect  exceeds  or  not  the  reduction  ln  the  demand  for  capital  goods
due  to  to  the  portfolio  shLft.  Note  that  this  approach  does  not  take
Into  account  the  eventual  declcIe  in  ezcesslve  inventorLes  when  firms
can  Invest  in  an  alternative  domestic  fLnancLal  assets.  If  inventorLes
are  reduced  to  normal  level,  productive  investment  may  increace.
The  upshot  of  all  thes  is  that  ono  camot predict  the  implication
of  changes  in  real  deposits  rates  without  having  some Lnsight  in  the
financial  structure  of  the  economy.  Specifically,  one  wants  to  know
which  asset  is  the  closest  substLtute  to  ban depoolts  (i.e  the
coeffLcients  oil.  £2,  and  implicitly  £,)  and  whether  the  banklng  system
wlll  be  allcwed  to  play  lts  intermediary  role  or  not  (L.e  the
coefficients  ,,.,  C.  and  implicLtly  C..).  In  that  sense,  a  financial
liberalizatLon  program  may dLrectly  improve  the  allocation  of  domestic
credit  to  the  extent  that,  with  positlve  real  interest  rates,  credlt
would  be  allocated  according  to  expected  productivLty  rather  than
transactLon  costs  and  percelved  risks  of  default  (see  M4Kenlon (1973)).
Since  financLal  liberalization  policies  may lnvolve  changes  not  only  ln
the  quantLty  of  lnvestment  but  also  in  the  quality,  we wlll  dicuss  more
precisely  on  this  point  In  the  empirical  part  of  the  paper  (see  sectLon
4),
2.  The Flexible  Accelerator  Model  of  Investment
The  approach  presented  in  section  1  clearly  stresses  the
substLtutLon  effects  generated  by  changes  in  interest  rates  on  assets
markets.  The portfolio  model  owes much to  the  pioneering  work  of  Van
Vijnbergen  (1983)  even  if  the  portfolio  shift  into  bank  deposits  Ls
coming  out  from  real  savings  instead  of  the  "curb  marketg  as  suggested
by  this  author.  Because  the  majority  of  the  authors  who attempt  to  study
the  relationship  between  real  interest  rates  and  real  private  investment
in  LDCs has  viewed  investment  only  as  the  demand for  capital  goods  by
the  users  of  capital  servLces,  we  introduce  into  the  analysis  this
second  aspect  (e.g.  Blejer  and  Khan  (1984),  Pry  (1980)  and  Tun Wai  and
Wong  (1982)).
The  demand for  capital  servLces  Ls usually  derived  from  an  adapted
version  of  the  flexible  accelerator  model.  This  approach  emphasizes  the
effects  of  the  resources  constraints  faced  by  private  investors  in
accordance  wLth  the  McKinnon-Shaw view.  In  the  long-run  representation
of  the  accelerator  model,  the  desired  stock  of  capital  (k*W) that  the
private  sector  wishes  to  have  in  place  can  be  assumed  to  be  proportional
to  expected  output  (y*)  :
(8)  k*P  Sy*
This  is  a  quite  standard  formulation  in  which  the  underlying
production  function  has  (technologically)  fixed  proportions  among10
factorS  inpUts so that  factor  priceS do not  enter  into the
specificationl2a/ it  iLs  asumed  that there is only a partlal
adjustment  of the  privte'ts  sector  actual  capltal  stock  to  lto  deolred
level  so that  we can  wrlte I
(9)  bkp  m B(k* 0 k  ,)
where  k,  is  the actual  private  capital  stock,  Olt,  Ls  not private
lnvestment,  and  B  is the  coefficient  of adjustment.  Gross  private
lavestment  is  made  up  of two  components  - net  inveotment  and
replacement.  Net Investment  results  from changes  In the desired  stock  of
capital,  whlle replacement  is here  assumed always  to  be  a  fractLon  a  of
the  capital  stock  on  hand  at  the  boginning  of  the  period  s
(10)  ip  - Okp +  akp  X
We then  substltute  equations  (8)  and  (9)  lnto  equatLon  (10),  and
we get  the  following  Investment  functlon  for  the  private  sectors
(11)  Lp  - Bey*  - (  - d)P,
In  order  to take lnto  account  the  exeistence  of llquidlty
consetraints,  the speed  of adjustment  between  desired  and  actual  private
capltal  stock  (B)  is assumed  to  vary systematlcally  with the
availabllity  of internal  funds,  bank credits  and  foreign  capital
inflows.  A linear  representation  of  this  relationshlp  is  s
(B,cf  +  13 2(OL,/P) +  138(6D,/P)
(12)  a  1  so  +  with  B3  > 0 i  1,2  and  3
(k*o  - k,-l)
where cf  is defined as flrms'  cash flow; a measure of lnternal  funds
available  for  financing  private  investment.
Equation  (12)  states  that  the  speed  of adjustment  is influenced
posltively  by the  total  flnancing  available  to the  private  sector
measured  in relative  terms  with respect  to the  size  of the  discrepancy
bet-een  desired  and  actual  private  capital  stock.  Note that  if the  signs
of the  parameters  in equation  (12)  are  all  expected  to be posltive,  the
impact  of the  three  alternative  sources  of financing  on the speed  of
adjustment  is  not assumed  to ba equal.  As bank credlts  depend  on the
flow supply  extended  by the  financial  sector  rather  than  the  demand  of
private investors, a flrm's  investment decision is independent  of its
financial  condition.  Recently,  Fazzarl,  Hubbard  and  Petersen  (1988)
demonstrated  that lnternal  and  ,ternal  resources  are  not perfect
substitutes  in a firm  with liqu4ity constraints.
12/  Using  an alternative  production  function,  the  desired  capital  stock
level  could  be also influenced  negatively  by the rental  price  of
capital. While this  specification  may complicated  the empirical
implantation  of the  model  - such  variable  cannot  be easily  calculated
for  developing  countries,  it  does  not change  significantly  the  results
presented  here.Finally,  subsetituting  equation  (12)  into  equation  (11),  we obtain
the  following  private  investment  function  t
(13)  ip  oly,  +  /41cf  +  P1 S(tQL,/P) +  pI6(D  /P )  +  plap_1
with 1 sc  o  30  a  _  G0
PM  8  0
A  riso in the  reaources  available  to the  private  sector  increases
the speed  of adjustment  so that  all  parametere  in equation  (13)  could  a
priori  be determined  positive.  If  we incorporate  this  equation  into  the
portfolio  model  presented  in  sectinn  2,  the  effect  of  an  increase  in
real  interest  rates  on  private  investment  appeare  to  be  unambiguously
positivel3/  s
dip  Piass
(14) - - >  0
dr  (l  1a,)
The general  conclusion  is  that  an  increase  in the  real rate  of
Interest  is favorable  to financial  savings  which,  in turn,  Increases  the
amount  of bank  credits  available  to the  private  sector.  This rise
influences  positively  the  speed  of adjustment  between  desired  and actual
private  capital  stock  and,  hence,  private  investment.  But this
presentation  provides  a  misleading  and  inconclusive  picture  of
effectiveness  of interest  policies.  In particular,  the  introduction  of
the  public  sector  into  the  analysis  may affect  dramatically  the former
result  since  the  government  can  absorb  part  of the resources  made
available  for  private  investment.  The  next  section  is  devoted  to the
demonstration  of this  crowding  out  effect.
30  The  Introduction  of the  Public  Sector
The  experience  of the  last  decade  Indicates  that  most LDC
government  financed  their  fiscal  deficit  with credits  from  the  central
bank.  Although  these  governments  could  conceivably  experiment  with this
source  of financing  if it  were an independently  controllable  variable,
it  would  generally  be more realistic  to treat  additional  borrowing  from
the  central  bank "0 as a  consequence  of fiscal  disequilibrium  or of the
inability  or unwillingness  to finance  the  growth  of exhaustive
government  expenditures,subsidies,  and  transfers  through  explicit  taxes
or  the sale  of government  debt  to the  private  aectorB  (von  Purstenberg
(1983,  p.233)).  Following  this  remark,  the  demand  of the  public  sector
for  central  bank credits  can  be specified  as s
(15)  OLO/P  ° def0 - Ob - 6D9/P
13/Without  loss  of  generality,  we  assume  that  the  cash  flow  of  firms  is
not  Influenced  by  a  variation  in  borrowing  and  leading  interest  rates
because  the  impact  of  such  variation  is  difficult  to  prodict.12
where  def0 ls  defined  as  the  total  fiscal  deficitl4/,  Ob as  the  sales
of  public  bonds  to  the  private  sector,  L /P  as  the  changes  in  domestic
credits  to  the  government  extended  by  the  banking  system  and D /P  as
the  variations  In  gross  public  external  debt.  Equation  (15)  empLaizes
that  most  LDC  goverment  have  financed  theig  deficlt  with  central  bank
credits  when  they  cannot  use  other  sources  of  financing.  Indeed,  in  many
developing  countries  financing  the  pub1Lc deficit  in  the  foreign  and
domestic  credit  markets  becomes  less  feasible  over  time  because  the
declining  credibility  of  the  public  sector.
The authorlties  can  administer  the  bonds  war' at  by  two  different
instrumentss  interest  rates  ceilings  and  controls  on  the  flow  supply  of
bonds.  If  either  the  interest  rate  on  public  bonds  or  the  flow  supply  of
bonds  is  treated  as  an  exogenous  varlable,  the  other  become  eadogenous.
With  the  interest  rate  exogenous,  the  goverment  chooses  to  fix  legal
ceilings  on  the  lnterest  rate  on  public  bonds.  In  theis  case,  the
quantity  of  bonds  is  only  determined  by  the  bonds  demand of  the  private
sector,  Alternatively,  the  government  can  choose  the  amount  of  bonds
exogenously  and  the  public  bonds  market  adjusts  through  a  variation  in
the  interest  rate  on  bonds.  Let  us  assume  that  the  interest  rate  on
public  bonds  is  fixed  and  that  the  quantity  of  public  bonds  is
determined  by  the  private  sector's  willingness  to  hold  public  bonds.
From equation  (3),  the  demand of  the  private  sector  for  public  bonds  is
equal  to  :
(16)  Ohb  - Oh - Le
The  presence  of  the  public  sector  can  alter  tne  positive  effect
of  financial  liberalization  on  domestic  credlts  and,  hence  on  private
Investment.  Introducing  equations  (15)  and  (16)  lnto  the  model,  the
total  impact  of  a  variation  in  real  interest  rates  on  the  quantity  of
bank  credits  available  to  the  private  sector  is  the  followingUl/ 
14/The  total  fiscal  deficit  can  be  expressed  as  i
def  - [(Lo  +  g  - t]  4  (Lb  - f)B3/P  +  (It  - W)LO, 1 /P  +(i*  - W  /P
where  ib  is  the  nominal  interest  rate  on  public  bonds,  1i  the  nominal
lending  rate  on  domestic  credit  to  the  pubilc  sector,  i  the  foreign
nominal  interest  rate,  l.  public  investment,  g  public  current
expenditures,  t  net  taxes,  B..  the  nominal  stock  of  pub1Lc bonds  in  the
beginning  of  perLod,  L,-1 the  nominal  stock  of  domestic  eredLt  to  the
pubLic  sector,  D.-,  the  nominal  stock  of  public  external  debt  and  P
price  level.
15/AgaLn,  for  simplification,  we  assume  that  a  variation  in  interest
rates  does  not  affect  the  public  deficLt.  In  fact,  even  If  the  interest
rate  on  public  bonds  Ls  assumed  to  be  fixed,  the  pubLc  debt-service
payments  will  increase  through  the  change  in  lending  rates  so  that  the
crowding  out  of  domestic  credit to  the  private  sector  is  stronger  than
suggested  in  (17).13
d(6Lg,,P)  (gas, +  ua2)  (01  +  2)
(17)-  - >  or  < 0
dr  (  l  I  e  o  (2 + pw)  089  +  s)
The  total  impact  of  an  increase  in  the  real  interest  rate  on  bank
credits  available  to  the  private  sector  cannot  be  a  priori  determined  in
multiplier  (17).  As suggested  by  McKinnon  and Shaw,  a rise  in the  real
rate  of  interest  increases  the  demand  for  national  liquidities  and,
therefore,  the  quantity  of  bank  credits.  But,  the  introduction  of  the
public  sector  into  the  analysis  sheds  light  on  an  important  channel
through  which  crowding  out  of  domestic  credits  to  the  private  sector
occurs  in  many  developing  countries.  The  financial  reform  may  exacerbate
the  demand  of  the  public  sector  for  bank  credits  and,  thereby,  limlting
the funds  available  to the  private  sector.  It is noteworthy  that  the
specification  chosen  here  suggests  that  the  crowding  out  does  not  come
from  a  change  in  the  government's  behavior,  but  from  a  shift  in  the
portfolio  of  private  agents.  As  demands  for  money  and  capital  goods
increase,  the  private  sector's  willingness  to  purchase  government  bonds
is reduced,  constraining  the  public  sector  to finance  its  deficit  with
more  credits  from  the  central  bankl6/.
Interestingly,  the  crowding  out  effect  does  not appear  very
sensitive  to  changes  in  different  sources  of  financing  of  the  fiscal
deficit.  In  order  to  prevent  the  diversion  of  domestic  credit  to  the
public  sector  following  an  increase  in  interest  rates  on  bank  deposits,
the  government  may  be  attracted  to  increase  simultaneously  the  interest
rate  on public  bonds  or, if the  interest  is endogenous,  to raise  the
flow  supply  of  bonds.  In  this  case,  the  crowding  out  of  domestic  credit
to  the  private  sector  will  not  come  from  the  portfolio  shift  from
domestic  bonds  into  monetary  assets,  but  from  the  increase  in  the  public
debt  service  on  domestic  debtl7l.  Similarly,  the  authorities  may
attempt  to  increase  the  gate  of  inflation an  usual  source  of  financing
in  a  large  number  of  LDCs°  economios.  The  impact  of  inflationay  finance
on  bank credit  remains  amblguous.  On one  hand,  the  effect  is  positive
through  the  increase  in  public  bonds  demand  (indexed  assets)  and  the
reduction  in  the  public  debt-service  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  effect
is  negative  through  the  decline  in  money  demandl8/.
16/  The sam  argument  was  used  a  decade  ago  by  various  authors  in order
to  justify  Interest  controls  in  LDCs  (e.g.  Nicole  (1974)  and  Polak
(1989)).  These  authors  suggested  that  lf  the  rate  of interest  on  bank
deposits  is  kept  low,  investors  lack  an attractive  alternative  to
investing  in  government  paper.
17/An  increase  in  the  interest  rate  on  public  bonds  raises  the  debt
service  of  the  domestic  debt  and,  therefore,  the  public  deficit.
18/Of  course,  this  discussion  on  the  effect  of  a  variation  in  the  rate
of  inflation  is  tentative  because  inflation  is  treated  as  an  exogenous
Variable  In  the  model  and  the  Oliveira-Tansi  effect  Is  not  taken  into
account.14
Using equation (17),  we can  successively define  the short=inm
total effect of a  change in real interest rates on the demand for
domeotic assets and private investment s
dOh  3e(la  +
(18)  - a  L8+  or 6  0
dc  M98  +  Ihis)
dip  P/S(W  + (2a)
(19) -c  . _or  < O
dr  (0  +  PS-)
Equations  (18) and (19) suggest that  the  effect  of  financial
liberalization cannot be a priori determined on domestic assets demand
and private investment.
In summary, the complete model consist of three behavioral
relationships - equation (4a), (4b) and (13) - and four technical
relationships - equations (1), (6), (15) and (16). Together these seven
equations can be used to explain AM, OH, 07, OB, OLp  and OL..  The
complete model is presented in Table 2. Within this framework, we
address  the  critical  issue of  whether the  positive effect suggested by
McKinnon and Shaw is strong enough to offset the crowding out of
domestic credits and the shift from real savings into  monetary assets
that could occur in the portfolio of the private sector.
4. An EMgirical Test s the Case of Argentina (1961-82)
The model developed in the last section could be used in principle
to examine the short-run effect of a variety of shocks on private
investment and other endogenous variables of the model, By estimating
the model for Argentina and by stimlating  it, the response of key
variables to changes in real rates of interest will be derived for this
country.
The data on S.,  Y, ON, F, I*. and AR have been obtained from the
-International  Monetary fund's International Financial Statistics. Series
from the World  Bank  (1985)  and  the  Central Bank of Argentina have also
been used for ir,  r, iJ, AB, ODp,  D0D9  OD,  0LP,  OLG# defg,  Ie,  and
IPrL/.  All variables have been deflated by the wholesale price index
(1974 - 100). The  data  on  private  wealth stock (W,,.)  have been
constructed by cumulatively adding the time series on private savings.
Since linear functions are used, the error in estimating the initial
wealth stock can be readily absorbed into the intercept term. The net
profit of the banking sector (  nw) has been calculated as the residual
of the financial system budget constraint2O/. While we attempted to
19/The  variable  r is defined as  s  rt  r  ((I  +  It)I(l+I't))  - 1 where it  is
the nominal interest rate.
20/  Onw  (0LP/P)  - Am +  (bR/P)  +  (OLOIP)measure  the  expected  rate  of inflation  (p0)  using  the  adaptative  and
perfect  expectations  hypotheses21/.  only  the  results  obtained  with
perfect  expectations  are  preseented  in  this  paper.  Perfect  foresight
expectations  seeiA  more approprlate  than  adaptative  because  the  cost  of
Ignoring  the  future  effects  of  current  pollcy  actlone  can  be  qulte  hlgh
for economies  that  have a hiLstory  of rapid  lnflatLon.  Assuming  that
economic  agents  refer  to  domestic  condltions  rather  than  to  the  foreign
real  interest  rate,  we  defined  the  expected  rate  of  return  on  foreign
assets  only  wlth  the  rate  of  inflatlon,  Data  limltation  enforced  us  to
approximte  the  fimascash  flow  with  the  difference  between  potential
and  effective  levels  of  productlon  as  measured  by  the  Wharton  index
(IINDW).  We  assume  that  the  enterprises  could  respond  more  easily  to
changes  in  desired  investment  when  demand  conditions  are  buoyant.
Finally,  in order  to improve  the  specification  of the  model,  we
introduced  into  equations  (4)  an  indicator  of  uncertainty  about
inflation  (VE)  measured  as  the  variation  of  the  rate  of  inflation22/
and  we  incorporated  public  investment  (l3)  into  the  private  investment
function  (13)  ao  suggested  by  various  authors231.
In  table  2  we report  three-stage  Least-Squares  (3SLS)  estimates
for  Argentina  over  the  1961-82  period.  On  the  whole,  the  results  are
quite satisfactory.  The  explanatory  power (I')  and  DV are  both
acceptable,  suggestlng  a  good  specificatlon  of  the  model.  The  most
interestlng  aspect  of  these  results  concern  the  real  rates  of  interest.
Indeed,  the  estimated  coefficients  for  r  appear  to  be  positive  on
financial  savings  (dAM/dr  - 3.672)  and  negatlve  on  real  savings  (dOH/dr
-1.234)  and  capital  flight  (ddJ/dr  - -2.438).  These  results  seem  to  be
quite  compatible  with  the  Argentine  experience,  e.g.  World  Bank  (1985).
For instance,  the  deregulation  of interest  rates  in  1977 resulted  in a
further  increase  in  real  interest  for  deposits  and  thus  there  was  a
dramatic  increase  of  savings  through  the  banking  system.  Our  estimates
suggest  that  the  buildup  of deposits  was backed  by repatriation  of
capital  invested  abroad  and  by  decreasing  demand  for  public  bonds  and
capital  goods.  In  short,  an  increase  in  the  real  rates  of  interest
involved  a  portfolio  shift  from  capital  goods  and  foreign  assets  into
monetary  domestic  assets.  However,  these  estimates  include  only  the
direct  effects  of  a rise  in  interest  rates  and,  therefore,  they  cannot
be interpreted  as  the  total  effect  of  such  increase  (see  below  for
further  explanations).
Also of relevance  is  whether  the  banking  system  has  played  its
intermediary  role  or  not.  The  estimated  impact  of  a  variation  in  flow
supply  of  credit  (Ld)  on  private  investment  (dij/d(OLp/P)  - 0.258)
21/This  reflects  the  fact  that,  although  rational  forecasts  could  differ
from  actual  price  movements  in  stochastic  models,  rational  expectations
are  equivalent  to  perfect  foresight  in  deterministic  models.
22/see  Blejer  (1979)  and  Gupta  (1984).
23/For  instance,  see  Blejer  and  Khan  (1984)  and  Sundararajan  and  Thakur
(1980).16
Indicates  that  only  a  pare of banking  credit  h2s  been  used to finance
productive  Investment  in  Argentina.  But,  this  is  probably  an
underestimate  of the full  effect  of  financial  liberalization  on private
investment  because  this  policy  can  also  increase  the  efficiency  of
investmont.  In particular,  higher  intereot  rates  can improve  the
allocation  of  credit,  thereby  increasing  the  productivity  of  investmnt
projects.  AO  an  illustration,  the  relationship  between  the  incremental
output/capital  ratio  and  the  real  interest  rate  on  deposites  appears
positive  and significant  In the  case  of Argentina241.  This suggests
the  existeace  of a positive  effect  of an increase  In interest  rates  on
the  quality  of  investment25/.
The  results  pertaining  to  the  other  variables  also  deserve  a  brief
explanation.  The  estimated  coefflcient  of  Y is  positive  on  financial
savings  and  not  asignificant  on  real  savings.  The  effect  of  ADp/P  seems
to  be  positive  on  financial  savings  and  negative  on  real  savings.  As
equations  are  linearly  dependane,  we  able  to  deduct  that  an  increase  in
external  debt  led  to  capital  flight  during  the  1961-82  period  in
Argentina  (ddJ/(dODp/P)-  0.445).  This  positive  correlation  could  be
explained  from  the  liquidity  effect,  corruption  and  policies  which
simultaneously  promoted  foreign  borrowing  and  capital  flight,  e.g
overvaluation  of  the  local  currency.  The  positive  relationships  between
the  flow  supply  of  credit  (OLP/P)  and  the  demands  for  financial  savings
and  for  real  savings  are  compatible  with  a  priori  theoretical
expectations  since  the  Argentinean  private  sector  han  been  liquidity
constrained.  The  expected  rate  of  inflation  (OQ)  seerAs  to  have  exerted  a
positive  effect  on  financLal  and  real  savings.  With  respect  to  real
savings,  this  result  corresponds  to the  one  predicted  by the  theoretical
analysis  and,  with  respect  to  financial  savings,  it  could  be  explained
by the fact  that  banking  deposits  (in  particular  short  term  deposits)
have  been  indexed  in  perLods  of  high  and  variable  inflation.  The
negative  effects  of  VE  on  domestic  assets  demand  and  money  demaand
confirm  that  uncertainty  about  inflation  has  increased  capital  flight.
Finally,  the  estimation  of  the  real  private  investment  function  seems  to
be  satisfactory  since  all  parameters  have  the  expected  signs,  except  the
variables  kp-,  y1 and  (ADp/P)  whose  effects  do  not  appear  significant.
Note  that  public  investment  has  a  positive  effect  on  private  investment,
suggesting  that  complementary  relationships  between  both  investment
categories  dominate  in  Argentina.
Dynamic  simulations  (i.e.  lagged  variables  are  those  generated  by
the  model  Ltself)  show  that  the  goodness-of-fit  of  the  model  as  a  whole
is  satisfying  for  Argentina  over  the  1961-82  period.  Table  3 provides
24/We  ussd  the  procedure  proposed  by  Pry  (1988)  and  Gelb  (1989).  The
estimated  coefficient  for  Argentina  is  equal  to  1.206  on  the  1961-82
perlod.
25/However,  beyond  the  interest  rates  level,  important  factors  such  as
the  high  degree  of  interlocking  ownership  and  control  that  existed,  and
that  continues  to  exist,  between  industrial  firms  and  financial
institutions  may  jeopardize  financial  liberalization  policies  in
Argentina.17
the  correlation  coefficient  between  historic  and  simulated  serles  and
Theilos  Inequality  coefficient  for  the  endogenous  variables.  If  these
coefficients  indicate  that  the  small  structural  model  is stable  and are
indicative  of  its  robustness,  needless  to  say,  that  our  simulation
results  have  to be  viewed  with  some care.  Actually,  they  are  intended
primry  as an illustration  of our  theoretical  argumentso  and  not as
perfect  representation  of  the  Argentinean  economy.
The model  could  be  used  as  basis  for  deriving  the  short-run  total
response  of  private  investment  to  an  increase  in  real  rates  of  interest.
Since  the  model  is  linear,  the  siimulations  results  are  independent  of
the  starting  conditions  and,  moreover,  they  are  qualitatively
independent  of  the  absolute  size  of  the  shock.  In  Table  4 we  report  the
total  short-run  elasticity  of  the  main  endogenous  variables  of  the  model
to  a  one  percentage  point  increase  in  the  real  rate  of  interest.  Our
simulation  results  indicate  that  real  private  investment  is  little
responsive  to  int6rest  changes  (di  /dr  - -0.047),  but  this  is  not
surprising  since  it  reflects  the  presence  of  many  opposing  forces
allowed  for  by  the  model.  The total  interest  insensitivity  of  private
investment  is  largely  due  to  the  portfolio  shift  from  capital  goods  into
financial  savings.  On  one  hand,  the  increase  in  monetary  liabilities  is
favorable  to  private  investment  via  the  domestic  credit  market  as
suggested  by  McKinnon and  Shaw.  On  the  other  hand,  this  portfolio  shift
undermines  the  private  sector's  willingness  to  hold  capital  goods  and
government  bonds  (d  b/dr  - -0.459).  This  last  effect  implies  that  the
financing  of  the  public  deficit  in  the  domestic  credit  market  become
less  feasible  and  credits  from  the  banking  sysetem must  be  used  to
finace  part  of  the  deficit  (d  L./dr  - 0.376).  In  order  to  offset  the
expansionary  effect  of  large  domestic  credits  to  the  public  sector  on
money supply,  the  monetary  authorities  have  to  keep  credits  to  the
private  sector  under  strict  control.  As  a  consequence,  the  resulting
changes  in  private  real  investment  depend  critically  on whether  the
Increase  in  domestic  credits  due  to  the  McKinnon-Shaw  effect  exceeds  or
falls  short  of  the  reduction  in  dossetic  credits  due  to  the  crowding  out
effect.  Emplrical  results  seem to  indicate  that  for  Argentina  the
negative  effect  is  higher  than  the  positive  effect  (d  L 0Id-  -0.284)  so
that  the  total  effect  of  financial  liberalization  is  weak  (even
negative)  on private investment.
5.  Conclud4n  remarks
The  purpose  of  this  paper  has  been  to  demonstrate  with  a  simple
structural  model  that  a  number  of  factors  can  influence  the  relationship
between  real  Interest  rates  and  private  investment  in  LDCs.  We
emphasized  on  two  specific  problems.  Pitat,  we pointed  out  that  the
positive  effect  of  a  rise  in  domestic  credit  as  suggested  by  McKinnon
and  Shaw  could  be  offset  by  a  portfolio  shift  from  capital  goods  Into
monetaMr  assets.  Second,  we  demonstrated  that  a  financial
liberalization  policy  could  increase  the  demand  of  the  public  sector  for
credit  extended  by  the  domestic  banking  syetem,  therefore  limiting  the
funds  avallable  to  the  private  sector,  It  Is  noteworthy  that  this
crowding  out  effect  does  not result  from  a  change  In the  government's
behavior,  but  rather  from  a  shift  in the  portfolio  of  private  agents.18
Higher  demand  for  bank  deposits  reduces  the  private  sectorue  willingness
to  hold  government  bonds  so  that  the  public  sector  is  required  to
finance  a  given  budget  deficit  with  a  larger  amount  of  domestic  credit.
While  the  model  has  been  estimated  for  Argentina,  it  is  quite  apparent
that  this  specification  can  be  readily  applied  to  other  developing
countries  as  well.  The general  conclusion  that  emerges  is  that  the
effect  of  interest  rates  policies  on  the  demand for  capital  goods  Is
weak  in  the  case  of  Argentina,  albeit  the  total  impact  might  be  stronger
on  the  quality  of  investment  than  on  the  quantity16/.  The absence  of
any  strong  relationship  between  real  interest  rates  and  the  quantity  of
lnvesment  does  not  result  from  exceedingly  small  direct  interest
elasticities  of  private  investment.  Instead,  it  is  due  to  the
Interactions  of  a  number  of  mechanisms  allowed  for  by  the  model  which
tend  to  neutralize  the  impact  of  such  policies.
Although  the  model  used  in  this  paper  could  be  improved  in  mny
ways,  e.g.  inflation  should  be  endogenous  and  it  is  very  unlikely  that
real  interest  rate  policies  can  be  considered  as  exogenous  even  if  it
rates  are  controlled  rather  than  market-determined  (e.g.  Gelb  (1989)),
the  policy  implications  of  the  exercise  are  straightforward.  The
increase  In  real  Interest  rates,  which  is  a  typical  element  of  financial
reforms,  do  not  necessarily  involve  a  positive  effect  on  private
investment  unless  the  authorities  are  careful  to  ensure  that  s
(1)  Bank deposits  are  closer  substitutes  to  unproductive  assets  (cash,
gold)  and  foreign  assets  rather  than  to  capital  goods;
(2)  The  financial  sector  assures  an  efficient  allocation  of  domestic
creditss
(3)  The  flow  of  domestic  credit  to  the  private  sector  is  not  absorbed  by
the  need  of  the  public  sector.
BIBLIOGEAPHYS
H.  BLEJER,  'The  Demand for  Honey and  the  Variability  of  the  Rate  of
Inflation  s  some  Empirical  Results',  International  Economic  Review,  20,
june  1979
H.  BLEJER  & T.  TANZI, "Inflation,  Interest  Rate  Policy  and  Currency
Substitutions  in  Developing  Economies  s  a  Discussion  of  some  Hajors
Issues",  World  Development.  vol.10,  n.9,  sept.  1982
H.  BLEJER  & H.  KWAN,  "Government  Policy  and  Private  Investment  in
Developing  Countries',  IMP Staff  Payers,  vol.31,  n.2,  June  1984.
C.  BRAINARD  & J.  TOBIN, 'Pitfalls  in  Financial  Model  Buildingo,  American
Economic Review,  1968
E.  CONESA,  "The  Causes  of  Capital  Flight  from  Latin  America',  Washington
D.Cs  Inter-American  Development  Bank,  working  paper,  1986.
R  CUMBY  & R.  LEVICH,  'On  the  Definition  and  Magnitude  of  Recent  Capital
Flight',  in  Capital  Flight  and_Third  World  Debt,  D.  Lessard  and  J.
Williamson  (eds),  Institute  for  International  Economics,  Washington
D.C.,  1987
26/It  could  be  clearly  of  interest  In  some future  work  to  extend  the
analysis  in  this  direction.9  ~~~~~~~~~~~~19
J.T  CUDDINGTON,  "Macroeconomic  Determinants  of Capital  Flight  :  An
Econoetric Investigationa,  In  Capital  Flihe  and  Third  World  Debt.  D.
Lessard  and  J. Williamson  (edo),  Institute  for  International  Economics,
Washington  DC.o . 1987
R. DORNEBUSC  & J.  de  PABLO,  "  Debt  and  Macroeconomic  InstabliltY  In
Argetinag,  The  University  Press  of  Chicago9 1988.
S.  FAZZARI,  R.  HUBBARD  & B.  PERTERSEN,  Fi  nancing  Constraints  and
Corporate  Investment",  Brooklngs  Papers  on  Economic ActLvity 0 1,  1988
S.  FISCHER, nAntlclpatione  and  the  Nonneutrallty  of  Money",  Journal  of
Political  Economy.  vol.87,n.2,  aprll  1979.
M.  FRY,  1SavLngs9, Investment,  Growth  and  the  Cost  of  Financial
Repression",  World  Development,  vol.89  1980.
M.  FRY,  "Money,  terest,  and  Banklng  in  Economic  Development6,  The John
Hopkins  Unlversity  Press,  19880
A.  GELB, "Financial  Policies,  Growth,  and  Efficiency 6 ,  World  Bank
working  Papers,  202,  June  1989.
A.  GIOVANNINI,  "The  Interest  Elasticlty  of  Savings  in  Developing
CountrLees  the  Existing  Evidence6 ,  World  Deve  e,  vol.11,n.7,  1983
K.L.  GUPTA,  "Finance  and  Economic  Growth  in  Deyelopins  Countries,  Croom
Helm,  London  1984.
N.  U.  HAQUE,  "Flscal  Policy  and  Private  Sector  Saving  Behavior  in
Developlng  Countries",  IM Staff  Papers,  vol.35,  n.2,  june  1988
D.  KHATKHATE,  "Assessing  the  Impact  of  Interest  Rates  in  Less  Developing
Countries 6 ,  World  Development,  vol.16,n.5,1988
R.  McKINNON, 'Money  and  Capital  in Economic  Development 6, Washington
D.C.,  Brookings  Institution,  1973.
P.  HONTIEL,  "Credlt  and  Fiscal  Pollcies  in  a  Global  Monetarist  Model  of
the  Balance  of  PaymentsO,  IM Staff  e,  vol.31,n.4,  october  1984
J.  MORISSET,OL'affectation  du  financement  externe  dans  un  pays  en  vole
de  developpements  un  modele  de  portefeuille",  Revue  d'Economie
Politioue,  juillet-aout  1989.
D.  NICHOLS,"Some  Principles  of  Inflatlonary  Finance",  Journal  of
Political  Economy,  n.2,  march-april  1974.
J.J.  POLAK,  "Financial  Policies  and  Developmentu,  Center  for
Development,  OECD, paris,  1989.
D.  PURVIS, "Dynamic Models  of  Portfolio  Behavior  :  more  Pitfalls  in
Financial  Model  Buildings",  American  Economlc  Review,  LXVIII(3),  1978.
'E.  SHAW,  "Financial  Deepening  in  Economic  Development",  New  York,  Oxford
University  Press,  1973.
M. SIDRAUSKI, "Rational  Choice  and  Patterns  of  Growth  in  a  Monetary
Economy",  American  Economic Revlew,  vol.57,  n.2,  may  1967.
S.  SUNDARARAJAN,  "Debt-Equity  Ratio  of  FirLms and  the  Effectiveness  of
Interest  Rate  Policy  t  Analysis  wlth  a  Dynamic Model  of  Savlngs,
Investment  and  Growth  in  Korea",  IM Staff  Papers,  vol.  34,  n.2,  June
1987.
S.  SUNDARARAAN  & S.  THAKUR,  "Public  Invesetment,  Crowding  Out,  and
Growths  A Dynamic Model  Applied  to  India  and  Korea",  IM}  Staff  Papers,
vol.27,  n.4,  december  1980.
J.  TOBIN, "Money and  Economic  Growth",  Econometrica,  33,  n.4,  october
1965.
U.  TUN  WAI & C.  WONG,  "Determinants  of  Prlvate  Investment  ln  Developing
Countrles",  Journal  of  Development  Studies,  vol.19,  october  1982.
J.  TYBOUT,  "A  Firm-Level  Chronicle  of  Financial  Crisls  in  the  Southern
Cone",  Journal  of  Development  Economics,  24,  november  1986.20
8.  VAN  VIJNBERGEN,"Credit  PolLcy,  Inflation  ant  Growth  In a  Financlally
Repressed  Economy 0 ,  Journal  of  DeveloMent  Economics,  Vol.13,  august
1983.
0.  VON  8  TENBERG,  "The  Uncertain  Effects  of  Inflationary  Finance  on
Growth  In  Developing  Countries",  Public  Finance,  n.2.  1983.
THE  WORLD  BANK,,  Arentinas  Economic Memora8ndum",  Washington  D.C.o  1985.21
Table  1s
Expected  Signs  of the  Parameters
y  va  r  (r*+Z)  QDp/P  OLP/P
Ah  21 >0  eg  £>0  R<0  e4<°0  0%>0  g20"
e80  68>°  a2*Ao  eaS,C  a,94'10-  (KW%  ,,2°  >0
Table  2  s
Estimates  of  the  Model  for  Argentina  (1961  -82)
(t-statistics  are  In  parenthesis)
(4a)  Om  -0.652  +  0.06 9y  +  1.0121  +  3.67r  +  0.6730D,/P  +
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Table  3
Comparison  between  Historic  and  Simulated  Series  (1961-82)
Variables  correlation  coefficient  Theil's  coefficient
lJlam  0.901  334
oh  0.825  0.314
6g  o0.840  0.466
ip  0.780  0.203
OLp/P  0.757  0.544
ALgIP  0.687  0.497
Ob  0.770  0.532
table  4s
Direct  and  Total  ElastLcLtLes  of the  Real  Rates  of Interest,
Effect  Om  Oh  o  i  L  OL,/P  OL6/P  Ob
Dlrect  0.104  -0.034  -0.372
Total  -0.073  -0.160  0.258  -0.047  -0.284  0.376  -0.459
1. Evaluated  at  sample  meansEBE  Working  Eaper  Series
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